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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
SECURITY LEASING COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FLINCO, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant, Respondent and 
Third Party Complainant, 
vs. 
OFFICE EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATES, a 
corporation and JOHN B. JOHNSON, 
Third Party Defendants. 
ST A TEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Case No. 
169886 
This is an action to recover damages for cancellation and 
breach of certain lease agreements entered into between plain-
tiff-appellant Security Leasing Company and defendant- re-
spondent Flinco, Inc. 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The trial court rendered judgment on plaintiff-appellant's 
complaint in favor of defendant-respondent Flinco, Inc. and 
against plaintiff-respondent Security Leasing Company, no 
cause of action. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant Security Leasing Company seeks re-
versal of the judgment and requests that this court direct the 
District Court to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellant 
Security Leasing Company and against defendant-respondent 
Flinco in accordance with the evidence properly presented. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In early 1965, Flinco was in the market for a machine to 
handle its data processing (R. 213-214). At that time, Flinco 
was using Sentinel Life Insurance Company's computer to 
handle its work (R. 214). Because of Flinco's close ties with 
Sentinel, Bob Mastelotto, the manager at Flinco, relied upon 
Sentinel's employees and took them into his confidence in try-
ing to decide how best to improve the data processing at Flinco 
(R. 215). In this regard, Sentinel sent Jim Montgomrry, their 
data processing manager and programmer analyst, to Flinco to 
help evaluate their operation and see if any improvements could 
be made in data processing (R. 3 00). After having made his 
evaluation, he discussed his recommendations and the various 
possibilities that existed with Mr. Mastelotto (R. 301). During 
this same period of time, Mr. Mastelotto visited Friden, IBM, 
National Cash Register, and Ford Motor Company to learn 
about the different types of machines that were available to 
do data processing work (R. 193). After he had seen what 
was available and learned the capabilities of the various types 
of machines, he determined that a computyper, or something 
equivalent, was the way to go (R. 193-194). The decision, how-
ever, was contrary to the recommendation of Jim Montgomery 
of Sentinel (R. 3 02). 
3 
After having decided to go with the computyper, Mr. 
Mastelotto was mainly interested in the price (R. 218). In this 
regard, he contacted John Johnson of Office Equipment Asso-
ciates, who was referred to him by Eddie Mecham of Sentinel 
(R. 217-21 S). A meeting between Mr. Mastelotto and Mr. 
Johnson ensued in which the availability of a computyper, the 
price, and the capabilities of the machine were discussed (R. 194, 
309). Thereafter, other conversations took place between the 
two concerning the practical ways in which the machine would 
be set up so as to become operational and the manner in which 
the machine would be paid for (R. 197). Mr. Mastelotto de-
ci<led to lease the computyper but it was understood, at that 
time, that the lease was not to start until after the computyper 
w1s installed and all work necessary to place the machine in 
proper working order was accomplished at which time addi-
tional instruments would be executed, including a release, and 
the lease payment5 would then begin (R. 197, 313-314). 
Upon delivery of the computyper on April 26, 1965, Mr. 
Mastelotto, on behalf of Flinco, executed a document entitled 
Master Lease Agreement. (Exhibit P-1) . During the next three 
months, installation and all other work necessary to place the 
computyper in proper working order was performed by Mr. 
Johnson (R. 199-200, 226, 314-315). On July 29, 1965, Mr. 
Mastelotto, on behalf of Flinco, executed a document entitled 
Schedule A of the Master Lease Agreement, (Exhibit P-2), 
whereby Flinco agreed to !ease the computyper for a period 
of 60 months, and Flinco started making lease payments as of 
July 30, 1965. Also on July 29, 1965, a one-year Maintenance 
Agreement, (Exhibit D-6) was executed to cover the compu-
typer. On August 2, 1965, Mr. Mastelotto, on behalf of Flinco, 
executed a document entitled Lesee's Statement and Completion 
Certificate, (Exhibit P-4), in which he acknowledged that "all 
installation or other work necessary to the use thereof has been 
completed; that (the computyper) (has) been examined and/or 
tested and (is) in good operationg order and condition and (is) 
in all respects satisfactory to (Flinco) and as represented, and 
that the ( computyper) has been accepted by (Flinco) for the 
purpose of said Equipment Lease." 
Flinco used the computyper for a period of 16 months, 
from July 30, 1965 until December 2, 1966, at which time 
Mr. Mastelotto, on behalf of Flinco, notified the lessor, Secur-
ity Leasing Company, that it was terminating the lease and re-
quested that the lessor immediately remove the computyper 
from Flin co' s place of business. (Exhibit P- 5 ) . No prior noti-
fication of any dissatisfaction with the computyper had hecn 
given the lessor by Flin co ( R. 2 3 9) . 
On March 22, 1966, Mr .. Mastelotto, on behalf of Flinco, 
executed a document entitled Schedule A of the Master Lease 
Agreement, (Exhibit P-3), whereby Flinco agreed to lease a 
TCPC unit (Tape Card Punch Control Unit) for a period of 
60 months with payments to begin on May 30, 1966. It was 
upon the recommendation of Jim Montgomery of Sentinel that 
Flinco decided to obtain the TCPC unit (R. 306) although 
Mr. Johnson arranged for its procurement (R. 207). The lease 
covering the TCPC unit was also terminated by Mr. Maste-
lotto, on behalf of Flinco, in his letter of December 2, 1966 
to Security Leasing Company. (Exhibit P-5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE ORAL TESTIMONY TO VARY OR 
CONTRADICT MATTERS ALREADY COV-
ERED BY THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS JN 
--
VIOLATION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
Jn a very recent case, Rainford v. Rytting, _____ Utah 
2d_ , 4 51 P.2d 7 69 ( 1969), the Utah Supreme Court 
acknowledged the parol evidence rule as follows: 
"The rule is well settled that, where the parties 
have reduced to writing what appears to be a com-
plete and certain agreement, it will, in the absence 
of fraud, be conclusively presumed that the writing 
contained the whole of the agreement between the 
parties, that it is a complete memorial of such agree-
ment, that parol evidence of contemporaneous 
conversations, representations, or statements will not 
be received for the purpose of varying or adding to 
the terms of the written document." 
The parol evidence rule was acknowledged m Youngren 
1. john W. Lloyd Construction Company, 22 Utah 2d 207, 
450 P.2d 98 5 ( 1969), another recent Utah Supreme Court 
use as follows: 
''"When parties have negotiated on a subject and 
thereafter entered into a written contract, it should be 
assumed that their prior negotiations are fused into 
the contract so that it represents their full agreement 
with respect thereto; and that, consequently, after its 
due execution, extraneous evidence should ordinarily 
not be permitted to add to, subtract from, vary or 
contradict it." 
In Jones v. Acme Building Products, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 202, 
450 P.2d 743 ( 1969), yet another recent Utah Supreme Court 
case concerning the parol evidence rule, the Court cited, as 
authority, Emphraim ThPatrc Co. v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 
321 P.2d 221 (1958), wherein the Court stated: 
b 
"The purpose of a contract is to reduce to writ-
ing the conditions upon which the minds of the 
parties have met and to fix their rights and duties in 
respect thereto, and intent so expressed is to be found. 
if possible, within the four corners of instrument 
self in accordance with the ordinary accepted mean-
ing of words used. 
"Unless there is ambiguity or uncertainty in 
language of contract so that the meaning is confused 
or is susceptible of more than one meaning, there is no 
justification for interpretation or explanation from 
extraneous sources, sina it would defeat the very pur-
pose of formal contracts to permit a party to inuoke 
use of words or conduct inconsistent with its terms 
to prove that parties did not mean what they said, 
or to use such inconsistent words or conduct to dem-
onstrate uncertainty or ambiguity where none iuould 
otherwise exist. 
"Generally, neither of the parties, nor the Court 
may ignore or modify conditions which are clearly ex-
pressed merely because they may subject one of the 
parties to hardship, but they must be enforced in ac-
cordance with the intention as manifested by language 
used by the parties to the contract." (emphasis added) 
In the case at bar, there are four separate instruments 
which were executed by the parties, namely: Master Lease 
Agreement (Exhibit P-1), executed by Flinco on April 26, 
196 5 ; Schedule A, Amendment No. 1 to the Master Lease 
Agreement (Exhibit P-2), executed by Flinco on July 29, 
1965; Lessee's Statement and Completion Certificate (Exhibit 
P-4), executed by Flinco on August 2, 1965; and Schedule A, 
Amendment No. 2, to the Master Lease Agreement, (Exhibit 
P-3), executed by Flinco on March 22, 1966. 
--
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As mentioned in the statement of facts, there was an addi-
tional instrument entitled Maintenance Agreement (Exhibit 
D-6), under which John Johnson of Office Equipment Asso-
ciates agreed to render maintenance service on the equipment 
leased by Flinco from Security Leasing Company for a period of 
one year. 
It is submitted that the execution of these instruments con-
scituted an "integration", that is, the final and complete ex-
pression of the agreement of the parties concerning the leased 
equipment. 
Restatement of Contracts, Section 228, defines "integra-
tion" as follows: 
"An agreement is integrated where the parties 
thereto adopt a writing or writings as the final and 
complete expression of the agreement. An integration 
is the writing or wrifinxs so adopted." (emphasis 
added) 
Restatement of Contracts, Section 237, states: 
"The integration of an agreement makes inopera-
tive to add to or vary the agreement all contemporan-
eous oral agreements relating to the same subject mat-
ter, and also, unless the integration is void, or void-
able and avoided, all prior oral or written agreements 
relating thereto." (emphasis added) 
On April 26, 1965, contemporaneously with the delivery 
of a machine called a computyper which Flinco desired to 
lease, Flinco executed an instrument entitled Master Lease 
Agreement (Exhibit P-1) wherein Flinco agreed, among other 
things, to "lease the machines provided for in Schedule A at-
tached hereto and made a part hereof ... and to pay for the 
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leased property the monthly payments specified in Schedule A. 
Such payment and the leasehold term ... shall commence at 
the time of the signing of the lease, or upon delivery of the 
item to the lessee(s), whichever is later." Because of the nature 
of the equipment to be leased, it was understood by Flinco 
the party sought to be bound under the lease, that the 
payments would not start until after installation and all work 
necessary to place the machine in proper working order was 
accomplished, at which time, Schedule A, which was part of the 
lease, would be signed together with a release (R. 197, 313-314) 
thereby making the Lease Agreement complete. 
On July 29, 1965, some three months after delivery of the 
computyper, Flinco executed an instrument entitled Schedule 
A of the Master Lease Agreement (Exhibit P-2) wherein 
Flinco agreed, among other things, to lease the computyper for 
"a period of 60 months, at $129.00 + 4.52 tax per month be-
ginning July 30, 1965 ." 
On August 2, 1965, some four days after the execution of 
Schedule A (Exhibit P-2), Flinco executed an instrument en-
titled Lessee's Statement and Completion Certificate (Exhibit 
P-4) wherein Flinco acknowledged among other things, "that 
the (computyper) (has been) delivered to and received by 
(Flinco) ; that all installation or other work necessary prior 
to the use thereof has been completed, that (the computyper) 
(has) been examined and/or tested and (is) in good operating 
order and condition and (is) in all respect ( s) satisfactory to 
(Flinco) and as represented, and that the (computyper) has 
been accepted by (Flin co) for the purpose of (the Equipment 
Lease dated July 29, 1965)." 
It is submitted that the Master Lease Agreement (Exhibit 
P-1), Schedule A (Exhibit P-2) and Lessee's Statement and 
') 
Completion Certificate (Exhibit P-4), all together, constitute 
the final and complete expression of the agreement of the 
part!es concerning the lease of the computyper. 
Based upon the Lessee's Statement and Completion Certi-
ficate (Exhibit P-4) executed by Flinco on August 2, 1965, 
it is submitted that all testimony of any witness concerning 
oral statements and representations or agreements and under-
standing allegedly made by the parties or their authorized rep-
resentatives prior to August 2, 1965, should not have been 
admitted into evidence if such alleged oral statements, repre-
sentations, agreements or understandings relate to matters al-
ready covered in the Lessee's Statement and Completion Cer-
tificate, absent any proof of fraud in the inducement. 
Therefore, any oral statements, representations, agreements or 
understandings allegedly made prior to August 2, 1965, which 
relate to the following matters should not have been admitted 
into evidence: 
( 1) the installation or other work necessary prior to the 
use of the computyper (this would include pro-
gramming since the computyper would have to be 
programmed prior to the use thereof); 
( 2) the examination and/ or testing of the computyper; 
( 3) the operating order and condition of the compu-
typer; 
( 4) the satisfaction of Flinco with the computyper; 
( 5) the representations made by John Johnson as to 
what the computyper would or would not do; 
( 6) the acceptance of the computyper by Flinco for 
the purpose of the lease. 
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Flinco did not allege any fraud m its Amended Answer 
(R. 26-31), nor did it offer any proof of fraud in the execu-
tion of the three instruments above referred to. 
At trial, Mr. Mastelotto testified that the only reason he 
signed the Lessee's Statement and Completion Certificate (Ex-
hibit P-4) was because of the alleged threat of Mr. Johnson 
that if Mr. Mastelotto did not sign it Mr. Johnson would 
abandon them and since they had already spent so much mo11ty 
and time on the project Mr. Mastelotto signed the instrument 
(R. 200-201). Mr. Johnson denied these allegations and al-
leged that no such threats were made and, further, that the 
Lessee's Statement and Completion Certificate (Exhibit P-4) 
was signed by Mr. Mastelotto at Sentinel in Eddie Mecham's 
office in the presence of and with the apparent approval of 
Eddie Mecham and Jim Montgomery (R. 318-319). 
There is no evidence in the record as to any fraud, duress 
or undue influence in the execution of Lessee's Statement and 
Completion Certificate (Exhibit P-4) nor is there any evi-
dence in the record as to any expense or damages incurred by 
Flinco prior to or after the execution of said instrument. As 
a matter of fact, Flinco had paid nothing to Security Leas-
ing Company, John Johnson, or Office Equipment Associates 
prior to its execution on August 2, 1965, other than the first 
lease payment due under the lease dated July 29, 1965. 
Notwithstanding the paroJ evidence rule, however, the trial 
court admitted into evidence testimony as to certain state-
ments and representations allegedly made by John Johnson to 
Bob Mastelotto and Estella Anderson of Flinco as to what the 
computyper was capable of doing, as well as testimony concern-
ing the dissatisfaction of Flinco with the computyper because 
the machine allegedly never did do what John Johnson said it 
l j 
would do, all ot which were allegedly made prior to August 
z, 1965, the date the Completion Certificate was executed. 
This testimony was admitted over appellant's strenuous and 
continuing objections (R. 85, 86, 96, 100-105, 113, 149-150, 
19 3). 
We respectfully submit that the self serving testimony 
of Bob Mastelotto and Estella Anderson of Flinco which con-
cerned alleged oral statements and representations as well as 
alleged oral agreements and understandings between the parties 
should not have been admitted into evidence since they varied 
with or contradicted matters already covered in the written 
instruments and were therefore admitted in violation of the 
parol evidence rule. 
POINT II 
lN ADDITION TO THE FACT THAT THE 
COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING ORAL TESTI-
MONY TO ALTER OR CONTRADICT THE 
TERMS OF THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS, THE 
COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE WEIGHT OF 
SUCH PAROL EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT FLINCO. 
The Master Lease Agreement (Exhibit P-1), executed by 
Flinco on April 26, 1965, provided that "no representations, 
no express or implied warranties, regarding the equipment 
herein leased, has been made by Security Leasing Company". 
In the Lessee's and Completion Certificate (Exhibit 
P-4), executed by Flinco on August 2, 1965, Flinco acknowl-
edged that the computyper was "in all respects satisfactory and 
as represented." 
lfr, 
Notwithstanding these written instruments, and in viola-
tion of the parol eYidence rule, the trial court allowed into 
evidence oral testimony concerning ( 1) the alleged repre. 
sentation of John Johnson as to the capabilities of the compu-
typer in handling Flinco's data processing work and ( 2) the 
alleged dissatisfaction of Flinco with the computyper be-
cause the machine allegedly never did do what John Johnson 
said it would do. 
We submit that Flinco did not rely solely upon the repre-
sentations of Mr. Johnson as to the computyper's capabilities 
since Bob Mastclotto, Flinco's manager, had already decided to 
obtain a computyper, by purchase or lease, before he even 
contacted Mr. Johnson, who merely confirmed what Mr. Maste-
lotto had already le::irned about the computyper's capabilities 
on his visits to Friden, the manufacturer of the computyper, 
IBM, National Cash Register and Ford Motor Company (R. 
193-194, 216). 
Mr. Mastelotto stated that Mr. Johnson represented that 
the computyper was capable of handling invoicing and ac-
counts receivable, accounts payable and payroll (R. 194, 309). 
That a computyper is of performing these functions 
was confirmed by Mr. James P. Rice of Friden, the manufac-
turer of the computyper (R. 170). 
The computyper itself is merely a supplier of information 
and must therefore be used in conjunction with a computer in 
order to handle invoicing and accounts receivable, accounts 
payable, payroll or any other accounting function (R. 304). 
Flinco had been using the computer at Sentinel to handle their 
data processing before they became interested in a computyper 
(R. 215). The information which the computer needed to 
handle these various accounting functions was done by hand 
1 3 
prior to obtaining the cornputyper. The computyper would 
simply supply certain information that the computer needed 
and eliminate some work which was previously done by hand. 
Once it was determined what information the computer would 
need, the computyper would be programmed to supply this 
information. 
Therefore, in order for John Johnson to program the com-
putyper so that it would <;upply the necessary information, he 
needed to find out what information the computer would 
need ( R. 3 04-3 0 5) . In this regard, Bob Mastelotto arranged 
a meeting between Mr. Johnson and the data processing men 
at Sentinel, namely Eddie Mecham and Jim Montgomery (R. 
220). It was decided at this time that the computyper would 
be programmed to supply the information that Sentinel's com-
puter would need to handle invoicing and accounts receivable 
(R. 304-30 5). In this regard, Jim Montgomery instructed Mr. 
Johnson as to what information Sentinel's computer would 
need to provide the reportage which Flinco wanted, that is, in-
voicing and accounts receivable (R. 303-30q. 
Mr. Montgomery testified that in order to handle invoic-
ing and accounts receivable for Flinco, which was the reportage 
that Mr. Mastelotto had communicated to Mr. Montgomery that 
he wanted (R. 303), Sentinel's computer would need the fol-
lowing information: invoice number, customer number, station 
number, inventory number, salesman's number, quantity and 
price (R. 304). Mr. Montgomery further testified that as of 
July 29, 1965, the effective date of the Lease Agreement 
(Exhibits P-1 and P-2), the computyper checked out okay and 
was supplying all the information set forth above that was 
necessary for the computer to handle invoicing and accounts 
receivable <R. rnn. 
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A few days later, on August 2 ,1965, in Eddie Mecham's 
office of Sentinel in the presence of and with the apparent 
approval of Eddie Mecham and Jim Montgomery, Bob Maste-
lotto, on beh::ilf of Flinco, executed the Lessee's Statement and 
Completion Certificate (Exhibit P-4) in which it was acknowl-
edged that the computyper "was in good operating order and 
condition and in all respects satisfactory and as represented'' 
( R. 3 I 8 - 3 19 ) . 
It is submitted that the testimony of Jim Montgomery Wll 
the most reliable and unbiased of any witness who testified 
throughout the entire trial. He worked for Sentinel which was 
closely associated with Flinco and had no personal or financial 
interest in this matter whatsoever. 
Instead of relying upon the written instruments and the 
testimony of Jim Montgomery which supported said instru-
ments, the trial court apparently chose to rely upon the testi-
mony of Bob Mastelotto. Mr. :rvfastelotto knew the capabilities 
of 'l computyper and had already made the decision to obtain 
one, either by purchase or lease, before he contacted John John-
son (R. 216), and yet he inferred in his testimony that he did 
not have available to him the advice of experts in the area of 
data processing to whom he could turn concerning the advisabil-
ity of obtaining a computyper (R. 211, 215). Both Eddie 
Mecham and Jim Montgomery had many discussions with Bob 
Mastelotto about the various possibilities that existed to improve 
Flinco's data processing (R. 301). In January, February and 
March of 196 5, Jim Montgomery was sent to Flinco by Senti· 
nel to study and evaluate their data processing operation and 
make suggestions and recommendations as to how the system 
could be improved and the different possibilities that existed 
(R. 3 00). Jim Montgomery discussed these recommendations 
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30d possibilities with Bob Mastelotto before John Johnson ever 
came into the picture ( R. 217 -218). After Bob Mastelotto de-
cided to obtain a computyper but prior to, or shortly after, its 
installation, Jim Montgomery expressed his opinion to Bob 
Masrelotto that he did not think the computyper was the way 
to go (R. 3 02). Notwithstanding this advice, Bob Mastelotto 
went ahead. 
Instead of relying upon the written instruments and the 
testimony of Jim Montgomery, the trial court apparently chose 
to rely upon the testimony of Estella Anderson who testified 
she could remember in detail her first conversation with John 
Johnson, which occurred some four years before the trial, where-
in he allegedly made certain representations and statements as 
to the capabilities of the computyper, but she could not even 
remember if Jim Montgomery ever came to Flinco in January, 
February and March of 1965 to study and evaluate their data 
processing operation (R. 271). Jim Montgomery testified he 
talked to Estella Anderson some ten or twelve times during that 
three month period. He asked her questions about Flinco's sys-
tem as a part of his study and evaluation which was being made 
for the purpose of determining the possibilities that existed to 
improve their data processing operations (R. 300-301). 
It is submitted that the trial court erred in allowing into 
evidence the self-serving testimony of Bob Mastelotto and 
Estella Anderson to the effect that the computyper was not 
programmed to their satisfaction. This testimony is contrary 
to the written instrument which Bob Mastelotto executed on 
behalf of Flinco on August 2, 1965, and contrary to the testi-
mony of Jim Montgomery, the only really unbiased, 
uninterested witness in the entire trial. The inquiry into whether 
the computyper was ever programmed to the satisfaction of 
Flinco should have ended with the Lessee's Statement and Com-
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pletion Certificate (Exhibit P-4) wherein the answer to that 
inquiry is a resounding and unequivocal "yes"! 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT FLINCO SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN BARRED FROM CANCELLING 
THE LEASE AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF ESTOP-
PEL AND WAIVER AND LACHES. 
A person such as defendant-respondent Flinco, claiming a 
right to cancel a contract because of alleged misrepresentations, 
must, after discovery of the misrepresentations, announce his 
purpose and adhere to it. Fraile·v v. McGarry, 116 Utah 504, 
211 P.2d 840 (1949) and Taylor v. Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 
P.2d 222. 
The purchaser or lessee must evidence his intent to cancel 
by some unequivocal act either by notice or some act amounting 
to notice of intent to cancel. Frailey v. McGarry, supra, and 
McKellar Real Estate f:J lm·esfmcnt Co. v. Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 
218 P. 128. 
A party to whom alleged misrepresentations have been 
made, after learning the truth or being charged with a knowl-
edge thereof, will not be permitted to go on deriving benefits 
from the transaction and later elect to cancel. Frailey v. M.c-
Garry, supra, and LeVine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 
P. 2. 
A mere expression of dissatisfaction with a contract or lease 
1s not sufficient notice of election to cancel. Frailey v. Mc-
Garry, supra. 
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In Eitel v. Alford, 127 Colo. 341, 257 P.2d 955 (1953) 
the court stated: 
"Where one for many months has taken the 
fruits of his contract, he may not plead, in defense 
against liability thereunder, circumstances created 
through his own imprudence, nor claim ignorance of 
facts which it was his duty to know, and especially 
where, as here, the information was readily available . 
. . . If, under any theory of this cause, rescission was 
at any time justifiable, the remedy was lost by reason 
of unreasonable delay in bringing action when the 
facts were known, or readily ascertainable, and de-
fendants were upon notice and under duty to inquire. 
Young v. Leech, 78 Colo. 208, 212 P. 692. These 
principles apply even though, as was not the case 
here, the contract may have been the result of mutual 
mistake, or actual misrepresentation, fraud or deceit. 
Dozens of cases might be cited, of which we list only 
a few (cases cited)." 
In Terry 1·. Humpl'"eys, 27 N.M. 564, 203 P. 539 the 
court held: 
"Any transaction between the plaintiff and de-
fendant relating to the subject matter of the contract, 
inconsistent with an intention to rescind, amounts to 
a ratification and bars an action for cancellation." 
In Dennis v. Jones, 44 N.J.Eq. 513, 14 A. 913 the court 
held: 
"A party, upon discovering facts that entitle 
him to have the contract or conveyance cancelled, 
must proceed with reasonable diligence to disaffirm 
the contract and give the other party an opportunity 
of rescinding it; the party deceived may not go on 
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deriving all possible benefit from the transaction, and 
then claim to be relieved from his own obligations by 
seeking its rescission." 
In Rosenbaum v. Texas Bldg. f5 Mortgage Co., 140 Tex. 
325, 167 S.W.2d 506, the court held: 
"An express ratification is not necessary; any 
act based on a recognition of the contract or any con-
duct inconsistent with an intention of avoiding it has 
the of a waiver of the right of cancellation." 
In the case at bar, Flinco was aware of the alleged oral 
statements and misrepresentations of John Johnson concerning 
the capabilities of the computyper shortly after the computyper 
became operational in July, 1965. Flinco knew then what al-
leged problems existed insofar as the computyper was con-
cerned. 
Nevertheless, Flinco retained possession of the computyper, 
used the same to handle their data processing work, and made 
monthly lease payments thereon for a period of 16 months 
from July 30, 1965 until December 2, 1966 at which time they 
gave notice, for the first time, to Security Leasing Company, 
the lessor, that they had never been satisfied with the compu-
typer and they were cancelling the lease which still had 46 
months to go. The lease was cancelled notwithstanding the fact 
that printed in large black letters on each of the lease docu-
ments were the words: "THIS LEASE CANNOT BE CAN-
CELLED". 
We submit that by having the computyper in its posses-
sion for 19 months and using it for some 16 months, thereby 
reaping the benefits derived from the use thereof and, further, 
by treating the lease agreement as existing and binding by 
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making regular monthly lease payments to Security Leasing 
Company, the lessor, for 16 months, Flinco waived its right, if 
any ever evisted, to cancellation and it should be estopped from 
now denying the existence and binding effect of the lease and 
from cancelling the same. 
On March 22, 1966, Mr. Mastelotto, on behalf of Flinco, 
executed an amendment to the original lease agreement where-
in flinco agreed to lease a Tab Card Punch Control Unit 
(TCPC Unit) "for a period of 60 months at $26.62 + .93 tax 
per month beginning May 30, 1966" (Exhibit P-3). The de-
cision to obtain a TCPC Unit was made by Bob Mastelotto of 
Flinco, upon the recommendation of Jim Montgomery of Senti-
nel (R. 306) and its procurement from Friden was accom-
plished, at Mr. Mastelotto's request, by John Johnson (R. 207) 
who also arranged for its lease thereof with Security Leasing 
Company. This lease was also cancelled by Flinco on Decem-
ber 2, 1966, notwithstanding the fact that printed in large 
black letters on the instrument itself were the words: "THIS 
LEASE CANNOT BE CANCELLED". 
We submit that on March 22, 1966, by executing the 
.1mendment wherein Flinco agreed to lease the TCPC Unit, 
Flinco acknowledged and ratified the existence, validity and 
binding effect of the original lease agreement, the effective 
date of which was July 29, 196 5, wherein Flinco agreed to 
lease the computyper (Exhibits P-1 and P-2). 
We also submit that lessee, defendant-respondent Flinco, 
is guilty of laches in that it did not timely make known its 
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dissatisfaction with the leased equipment to the lessor, plaintifJ 
appellant Security Leasing Company, until after 16 month 
usage of the computyper and 6 months usage of the TCPC 
Unit and by using the leased equipment and deriving the bent 
fits from such usage for such period of time without makin" 
known its complaints , it has deprived the lessor, plaintif/ 
appellant Security Leasing Company, from obtaining full valut 
from resale or re-lease of the equipment and in view of sud 
long use thereof, lessee, defendant-respondent Flin co, cannot 
now be heard to complain. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that lessee, defendant-respondent Flinco, 
breached a legally enforceable and binding lease agreement 
threby causing damage to the lessor, plaintiff-appellant Securitr 
Leasing Company. 
The trial court erred in not relying upon the written rn 
struments and in admitting in evidence and relying instead 
upon prior and contemporaneous oral statements, representa-
tions and agreements which altered and contradicted the writ-
ten instruments. This evidence was admitted in violation of the 
parol evidence rule. 
The trial court also erred in finding the weight of the 
evidence in favor of lessee, defendant-respondent Flinco and 
in not estopping said lessee from cancelling the written lease 
agreement after it had used the leased equipment, derived the 
benefits therefrom and made the lease payments thereon for 
16 months after the effective date of the lease agreement. 
We respectfully request that this court reverse the judg-
ment of the trial court and direct said court to enter judgment 
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in favor of plaintiff-appellant, Security Leasing Company and 
against defendant-respondent Flinco in accordance with the 
evidence properly presented. 
--
Respe.rtfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, WATKISS, 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Security Leasing Company 
